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THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX EFFECTS OF
THE MISSOURI VERSION OF THE
UNIFORM DIVORCE ACT
ALAN GUNN*
Let us consider an everyday kind of -transaction. Suppose that a

husband and wife, after several years of marriage during which they
have acquired a house and some other property, are divorced' and,

pursuant to the divorce decree (or a settlement agreement), ,the wife
receives the house and the husband is obliged to make periodic pay-

ments to the wife.2 Sooner or later, both the husband and wife may
seek advice about the federal income tax consequences of these
events.

The husband will want to know whether -the transfer of his

interest in the house8 was a taxable event and whether the periodic
payments are deductible as alimony.

The wife will need to know the

basis of the house when she sells it, and whether the periodic payments are includible in her income. Unfortunately, if these events
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University. B.S., 1961, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute; J.D., 1970, Cornell University.
1. As a result, no doubt, of excessive exposure to the writings of sociologists, divorce reformers are not content to use simple words like "divorce;" what used to be
a "divorce" is now, in Missouri, a "dissolution of marriage." Whether the marital status of one who has been through a "dissolution of marriage" is "dissolved" or "dissolute" isunclear. It is likely that most people (even most lawyers) will continue to
use "divorce" in everyday speech, and I shall do the same in this Article. Another
manifestation of the divorce-reform crowd's urge to create new jargon is the use of the
term "maintenance" (which used to be something that was done to machinery) in place
of "alimony."
2. In order to avoid awkward phrases like "the transferee spouse," it will be assumed throughout this Article that the spouse transferring appreciated property and
paying alimony is the husband, although of course this will not always be the case.
Cf. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(17).
3. Because the public suffers from the delusion that joint ownership of property
is a desirable estate-planning device, it is likely that a married couple's house will be
jointly owned so that, at least if record ownership is to be controlling for tax purposes,
the common situation in which the wife emerges from the divorce proceedings with
ownership of the family home involves a transfer of the husband's undivided one-half
interest to her. See note 28 infra. If the wife receives the family home (previously
owned jointly) and the husband receives other jointly owned property of approximately
equal value, it is arguable that the entire transaction is a non-taxable division of joint
property. See cases cited note 32 infra.
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take place in Missouri, the conscientious tax adviser will not be able
to answer these "simple" questions with any assurance.
The principal causes of uncertainty about how ,the transaction de-

scribed above should ,be taxed are ,the "marital property" provisions of
the new Missouri "dissolution of marriage" law. 4 These provisions'
require the court granting a divorce or legal separation to "set aside
to each spouse his property" and to make a "just" division of the "marital property," defined as "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage" with five exceptions of uncertain scope. This
definition of "marital property" is roughly similar to -the usual definitions of community property, although the classification of property as
marital property is important only if the spouses are divorced or legally
separated. 6 In making a just division of the marital property the court
is directed to consider "all relevant factors," some of which are listed.
4. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 452.300-.415 (Supp. 1973).
5. Id. § 452.330 provides, in part:
1. In a proceeding for nonretroactive invalidity, dissolution of the marriage
or legal separation, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following
dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court
shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors including:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division
of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the
family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse
having custody of any children; and
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage.
2. For purposes of sections 452.300 to 452.415 only, "marital property"
means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
3. All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and
prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form
of coownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, and community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection 2.
6. Id. § 452.330.2.
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The parties may settle the disposition of their property and other matters 7 by entering into a written separation agreement, which will be
binding upon the court unless it is "unconscionable." '
These provi-

sions, with one significant exception,9 were taken from the Uniform
Divorce Act" and, while the subject of this Article is the Missouri

law, what is said here will be applicable also to property transfers in
other states which adopt the Uniform Act."
The marital property provisions of the new Missouri divorce law
render the tax treatment of property transfers and alimony payments
unclear. As to property transfers, the problem is that the new law
appears to give the wife an interest in property that previously would
have been regarded as belonging to the husband. Since this is so,
it is possible to argue that a "transfer" of appreciated property to the
wife is part of a "division" of property between "co-owners," and
therefore not taxable. Although transfers of appreciated property in
connection with a divorce are usually taxable,' 2 divisions of community
7. Id. § 452.325 states that the parties may enter into an agreement providing for
the maintenance of either spouse, the disposition of property owned by either spouse,
and the custody, support, and visitation of their children.
8. Id. § 452.325.2. Terms relating to child support, custody, and visitation are
not binding upon the court.
9. Under the Uniform Act the division of property is to be made "without regard
to marital misconduct," UNwORM Mmr rwEo AND DrvORcE AcT § 307, but the Missouri
law expressly provides that the court shall consider "[tihe conduct of the parties during
the marriage" in dividing the marital property, Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.1(4) (Supp.
1973). Another, minor, difference between the property division of the Uniform Act
and those of the Missouri law is that only the former list the "duration of the marriage"
as a factor to be considered in dividing property. UNu~o m MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE
AcT § 307(3).
10. For commentaries on the Uniform Act, see R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARIAuGE AND
DivoRcE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1969); Symposium, The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S. DAR. L. REv. 531 (1973). The property provisions
of the Missouri version of the Uniform Act are discussed in Fowler & Krauskopf, Property Provisions, 29 J. Mo. B. 508 (1973).
11. Parts of the Uniform Act have been adopted in Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky,
Nebraska, and Washington. Two of these states, Arizona and Washington, are community property states and the principal problem discussed in this Article-whether
marital property provisions such as those of the Uniform Act are so similar to community property statutes that the community property tax rules will apply to transfers
of appreciated property-should not arise there. The statutes are: ARiz. lEv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-101 to -381 (Supp. 1973); Ch. 130, [1971] Colo. Laws 520; KY. REv. STAT.
HI 403.010-.350 (1972); No. 820, [19723 Neb. Laws 246; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
26.09.010-.290 (Supp. 1973). At least ten more common law states have statutes providing for a division of marital assets upon divorce. The statutes are cited in Painter
v. Painter, 65 NJ. 196, -, 320 A.2d 484, 491 (1974).
12. See text accompanying notes 16-27 infra.
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property"3 (and, probably, other jointly owned property)"4 are not.
The unfortunate similarity between the Missouri marital property provisions and the usual definitions of community property gives some
credibility to the argument that Missouri property divisions should be
taxed in the same way as divisions of community property. As to alimony, the problem is that payments satisfying the formal requirements
of seotion 71 of the Internal Revenue Code have sometimes been held
not -to qualify for taxation as alimony because they were intended as
payments for the wife's property. Because they give the wife an interest in property that would otherwise be solely 'her husband's, the
marital property provisons can be used to challenge the tax status of
purported alimony payments, at least in cases where the husband receives the bulk of the marital property and the divorce decree or settlement agreement is ambiguous.1 5
I. TRANSFERS OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY IN
CONNECTION wiTH DIVORCE
A. In General: Transfers of AppreciatedNon-Community
and Community Property
The taxpayer in United States v. Davis10 transferred appreciated
stock to his wife pursuant to a property settlement agreement executed
in anticipation of divorce. In exchange for the stock -thewife released
her inchoate marital property rights under Delaware law. The Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's argument -that the transfer was
non-taxable because it was comparable to a division of property between co-owners, observing that
the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the
Delaware law do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The wife has no interest-passive or active-over the management or disposition of her husband's personal property ....
. . . Regardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden
on the husband's
property rather than to make the wife a part owner
thereof.17
Having decided that the transfer in Davis was a taxable event, the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See text accompanying notes 28-37 infra.
See notes 28-32 infra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 111-21 infra.
370 U.S. 65 (1962).
Id. at 70.

Vol. 1974:227]

TAX EFFECTS OF UNIFORM DIVORCE ACT

Court held that the amount realized by the husband was the value
of the wife's release of her marital rights,' 8 which, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, would be assumed to equal the value of the
property given up in an arm's length bargain. 19
Uncritical acceptance of the Supreme Court's view of the Davis

transaction as an "exchange!' in which the husband received "property"20 in the form of the wife's release of her rights might suggest

that Mrs. Davis had made a taxable exchange of those rights for
the property received from her husband,

but the

administrative

praotice has consistently been to treat the transaction as non-taxable
to the wife, 2 ' who takes the property with a basis equal to its fair market value on the date of the transfer.22 One authority explains the
non-taxability of the wife in a Davis transaction by saying that a wife's
inchoate marital property rights "are rights which are disregarded for
income tax purposes. ' 23 This position seems sound, although it con18. The rights in question consisted of the wife's right of intestate succession, her
right to a share of the husband's property upon divorce, and, in the case of real property, dower. Id. at 66-67.
19. Id. at 71-73.
20. "Property" here means property within the meaning of INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1001(b), which defines "amount realized" as "the sum of any money received
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
21. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 63. The administrative practice was
noted by the Supreme Court in Davis. 370 U.S. at 73 n.7. See also Mildred F.
Swaim, 50 T.C. 336 (1968), affl'd, 417 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1969).
22. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 63. See also Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). Under Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v.
United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954), the wife's basis is the value of the property she receives, not the value of what she gave up.
23. Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 176, 181 (1967): "[Tlhe marital property rights relinquished are
rights which are disregarded for income tax purposes-the property to which they relate
is treated as solely the property of the husband." Professor Schwartz goes on to argue
that the income tax is, in general, "a tax on the net increase in one's wealth as the
result of his or her commercial, profit-seeking ventures. Neither marriage nor the division of the family's property is such." Id. at 182. For a variation on this theme,
see Kilbourn, Puzzling Problems in Property Settlements-The Tax Anatomy of Divorce, 27 Mo. L. REv. 354 (1962). Professor Kilboum asks whether it is relevant,
in determining whether a wife realizes income on receipt of property upon divorce, that
she makes a practice of marrying and divorcing men in order to amass a fortune from
property settlements. Perhaps it should be relevant, but the apparent desirability of
taxing a wife who has lost her amateur standing does not refute the general rule that
a wife's receipt of property in satisfaction of her marital rights is not taxable, and since
this is so, it may follow that a wife's receipt of property in exchange for releasing her
marital rights should also be non-taxable. The one situation in which a wife is taxed
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flicts with the Supreme Court's rationale for holding that the taxpayer
in Davis had realized an amount equal to the value of the stock he

transferred to his wife. The Court answered the taxpayer's argument
that the amount realized was indeterminable by accepting the taxpayer's view of the transaction as an "exchange" and assuming that
the value of the wife's release of her rights in an arm's length transaction was equal to the value of the stock the husband transferred.24
This explanation seems to attach too much importance to the wife's
marital rights and the difficulty of valuing those rights. 5 A more saton such a receipt of property is that of alimony, and in that case the husband receives
a deduction for the payments. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(d), 215. The effect
of the alimony provisions is thus to shift the burden of taxation of part of the husband's income from him to the wife, rather than to tax both husband and wife on income that is received by him and transferred to her. If the wife in a Davis transaction
were taxed, no corresponding deduction would be given the husband. For an argument
for taxing Mrs. Davis, see Mullock, Divorce & Taxes: Rev. Rul. 67-221, 24 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 736 (1969).
24. 370 U.S. at 71-73. It is worth noting that the Court engaged in this discussion of the transaction as an "exchange" primarily to answer the taxpayer's argument
that he could not be taxed because the amount he had realized could not be determined.
The more fundamental question-whether the transfer of appreciated property was a
taxable event-was approached by the Court as a question of when the economic
growth in the husband's stock was to be taxed. None of the reasons given by the
Court for holding that the transfer in Davis was taxable turns upon the husband's receipt of "property" in any form. Although §§ 1001 (a) and (b) of the Code seem to
require that property be received for an "amount realized" to exist, Professor Kilbourn
argues that the legislative history of those sections shows that the "fair market value
of the property . . . received" language in § 1001(b) was intended to apply only to
property-for-property exchanges, not to the case of "other disposition" of property. Kilbourn, supra note 23, at 380-83.
25. The wife's release of her martial rights cannot be entirely ignored in analyzing
a Davis transaction, for the husband's receipt of the release of those rights may be
what prevents characterization of the property transfer as a gift. But recognition that
the wife's release of her rights shows that no gift has been made does not make valuation of the released rights important.
For an interesting case in which the court recognized the unique nature of a wife'a
marital rights, see Fox v. United States, 74-1 U.S. TAX CAs.
9358 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The taxpayer in Fox sought to deduct imputed interest on installment payments to his
former wife. The Government argued that the wife's release of her inchoate marital
rights was not a "sale or exchange of property" under § 483, so that the imputed interest provisions did not apply. The court held that the subject matter of marital property
settlement agreements is "so unique" that § 483, which "was drafted in a commercial
setting," should not apply. Id. Therefore, since the payments in question did not qualify for a deduction under § 71, no deduction was allowed.
The property settlement agreement in Fox expressly provided that the payments in
question were to be made "without interest." Had a portion of the payments been expressly designated as interest, a deduction would undoubtedly have been allowed.
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isfactory approach to the problem might be to say that the value of
the transferred property is the amount realized by the husband, not

because he has received "property" of equal value in exchange, but
because he has used the property to discharge an obligation in an
amount equal to the value of the property. That is, when a taxpayer
uses property that cost him $2000 to discharge an obligation to pay
$10,000, he is taxable on the $8,000 difference not because he has

received $10,000 worth of "property" but because he has gotten
$10,000 worth of use out of his property in discharging an obligation
in that amount.2 6 If this explanation is correct, the amount realized
While § 483, which was in issue in Fox, applies only to cases involving the sale or
exchange of property, § 163 is not so limited.
26. This certainly is the case where the husband's obligation is to pay a fixed sum.
The result should not differ in cases where the husband's obligation is not liquidated,
for the difference between a husband who is ordered to pay $10,000 and who satisfies
that obligation with $10,000 worth of property and a husband who is ordered to transfer property worth $10,000 is not sufficient to justify taxing the former but not the
latter. But it is possible that when appreciated property is used to satisfy an obligation
to pay a fixed sum the amount realized is the amount of the obligation rather than
the value of the transferred property. See Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947), acquiesced
in, 1947-2 CUM. BULL 2. But see Barton, Tax Aspects of Divorce and Property Settlement Agreements-The Davis, Gilmore and Patrick Cases, U. So. CAL. 1964 TAX
INsT.421, 428-29.

The "sale or exchange" necessary for characterization of the husband's gain on the
transfer of appreciated property as capital can be found without viewing the husband
as receiving "property." See, e.g., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1940); Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 194; Rev. Rul. 66-207, 1966-2 CuM. BULL.
243. The Government has not argued in the divorce cases that gain has been noncapital for lack of a sale or exchange.
An unresolved question under Davis involves the taxation of appreciated property
transferred to the wife to induce her to give the husband a divorce. It is safe to say
that the real reason for the willingness of some husbands to transfer substantial property to their wives is to free themselves from their wives rather than to free their property from their wives' marital rights. But property settlement agreements and divorce
decrees typically ignore this aspect of the problem, although the lower court in Davis
commented on it. United States v. Davis, 287 F.2d 168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd,
370 U.S. 65 (1962). Even if it were shown that all or part of a property settlement
was made in exchange for the husband's freedom, the transaction should be taxable to
him, for one who uses the appreciated value of his property to free himself from an
unsatisfactory spouse has realized that appreciation (in the sense of using it to obtain
a benefit) as much as if he had used the appreciation to free his property from his
wife's inchoate marital rights. Cf. Matthews v. United States, 425 F.2d 738 (CL Cf.
1970); Barton, supra at 446-47. To say that a property transfer in exchange for "freedom" should be non-taxable because the husband has not received "property" is to take
the Davis Court's "exchange" argument altogether too seriously. But the case for taxing the wife on receipt of a property transfer may be stronger if it can be shown that
she received the property as an inducement to giving her husband a divorce. In Lucille
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would be the value of the transferred property even if the taxpayer

could establish that the wife's release of her marital rights was worth
2

less.

The Davis case does not mean that every receipt of property by
a wife pursuant to a divorce decree or separation agreement subjects
-the husband to taxation on the property's appreciation, for Davis applies only when property is transferred from the husband to the wife.
If the decree or agreement merely awards the wife her own property,

no taxable transaction has taken place.28

The non-taxable nature of

Howard, 54 T.C. 855 (1970), a $40,000 payment to an ex-wife to induce her to release
purported dower rights in property so that the husband could sell the property was held
taxable to the ex-wife because she in fact had no dower rights.
27. In Matthews v. United States, 425 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl. 1970), the taxpayer transferred approximately $1,700,000 worth of property to her husband as part of a divorce
settlement. The husband "possessed no marital rights of any value under Florida law."
Id. at 750. The husband's right to an intestate share of the taxpayer's property would
have been worth only about $81,000 even if he and the taxpayer had not been divorced,
and that right was terminated by the divorce. The Court of Claims nevertheless found
that the taxpayer had received "significant benefits and advantages" under the settlement agreement, so that "the Davis assumption and presumption of equality in consideration must prevail." Id. at 754. The primary benefit obtained seems to have been
the husband's agreement to raise no objection to the settlement.
28. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 452-330.1 (Supp. 1973) directs the court to "set apart to
each spouse his property." The determination of what property belongs to each spouse
can be a difficult problem. Frequently there will not even be any evidence to show
who has "title" or who paid for the property. Even if it can be established that title
to particular assets is in one or the other spouse, or both, as will be the case with
realty or important intangible personal property such as stocks, bonds, and bank accounts, that title may not correspond to the spouses' understanding as to the identity
of the "real owner" of those assets. '"To penalize one of the spouses because most of
the family's property is in the other's name at the time of divorce would ignore the
'realities of American family living."' R. LEvy, supra note 10, at 165. If, for one
reason or another, title to property does not correspond to its "real" ownership, the
latter must be established to determine the extent to which there have in fact been
"transfers." For example, in David R. Pulliam, 39 T.C. 883 (1963), affd, 329 F.2d
97 (10th Cir. 1964), the taxpayer argued that he should not be taxed on the transfer
of appreciated real property to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree because the property already belonged to the wife. The court found that, although title to the property
had been taken in the wife's name, the husband was taxable on its "transfer" to the
wife because he had "paid for the property, managed it, controlled it, received all income from it, and treated it as his own." Id. at 885. Title had been taken in the
wife's name to gain an additional "grain-growing allowance." Id. Cf. Herbert A.
Cook, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1405, 1409 (1964) (husband's possession of stock certificate and exercise of "dominion, control, voting rights, etc." did not establish that
stock was his where he "exercised such control only as trustee for [his wife's] benefit,
not in any individual capacity"). See also Hornback v. United States, 298 F. Supp.
977 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (wife taxable on "sale" to husband of her interest in real property owned as tenants by the entirety, even though husband paid for property). These
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many divisions of community property may be explained as an applicaproblems arise less frequently under community property systems, since once it is established that an asset is community property it is not necessary to attribute ownership
of that property to one spouse or the other, but taxpayers in community property states
are faced with equally difficult problems of classifying assets as separate or community
property, problems that bring into play complicated tracing rules and presumptions.
The problem of establishing ownership of jointly owned property has been resolved
in the case of the estate tax by § 2040 of the Code, which provides for the inclusion
in a decedents gross estate of all property in which he had an interest as a joint tenant
or tenant by the entirety, except to the extent the estate can show that the other joint
owner furnished the property or the consideration for its purchase, or that the joint
owners acquired the property by gift or inheritance, in which case only the value of
the decedent's fractional interest is included.
The marital property provisions of the Missouri divorce law and the Uniform Act
do not attempt to resolve this problem; indeed, they circumvent it by providing that
marital property is to be awarded to one spouse or the other regardless of who has
title to the property. The factors which the court is directed to consider seem, however, to reflect notions of ownership. To the extent that the court is directed to consider the economic circumstances of each spouse and the conduct of the parties during
marriage, the marital property provisions may be read as authorizing a transfer of property to the spouse who, in the first case, most needs the property or who, in the second
case, most deserves it. But the first factor, "contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property," seems to reflect the idea that the spouse who paid for
the property is its owner. The direction to consider the "contribution of a spouse as
homemaker" is consistent with both the "ownership" view and the "transfer" view; it
is sometimes said, for example, that the wife as homemaker "contributes significantly
to the family's economic welfare by making it possible for the husband to earn income
and amass property during the marriage," R. LFuvy, supra note 10, at 165-66, but the
"contribution as homemaker" provision may also be regarded as directing a transfer of
property to the wife as compensation for her years of service in the kitchen.
The tax cases do not, for the most part, inquire into the local law theories under
which ownership of property may be found to be in the spouse who does not hold title.
In Missouri, there seem to be five theories which could be used to show that the spouse
who has title to property is not the owner. First, property to which title is held by
one or both spouses may be deemed to belong to the spouse who furnished the consideration for the property under a resulting trust. See, e.g., Hampton v. Niehaus, 329
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1959); Milligan v. Bing, 341 Mo. 648, 108 S.W.2d 108 (1937). See
generally A. Scorr, THm LAw OF TRusTs §§ 404-60 (3d ed. 1967) (and Missouri cases
cited therein); Nelson, Purchase-Money Resulting Trusts in Land in Missouri, 33 Mo.
L. REv. 552 (1968). Secondly, it has been held that under the Married Women's Act,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.250 (1969), a husband who invests the wife's money in property
to which title is taken jointly is a trustee for the wife unless she has consented to the
transaction in writing. Herzog v. Ross, 358 Mo. 177, 213 S.W.2d 921 (1948); MiUlligan
v. Bing, supra. Thirdly, an express oral trust in personalty will be enforced. A.
Scorr, supra §§ 39-52. Fourthly, property purchased by one spouse may be shown
to have been the subject of an inter vivos gift to the other. E.g., Kidd v. Kidd, 216
S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949). Finally, if both husband and wife participate in a
business venture, property may be shown to be the property of the joint venture, despite
title's having been taken in some other fashion. E.g., Donovan v. Griffith, 215 Mo.
149, 114 S.W.621 (1908).
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tion of this principle; a wife's receipt of "her share" of the community
property should be non-taxable because there has been no transfer of
property from -the husband. The clearest case is that in which the
husband and wife each receives a one-half interest in each item of
community property. It is also well-established -that no taxable event
takes place if each spouse receives one-half (or nearly one-half) of
the value of the community property; thus, if the community property
consists of $100,000 worth of stock and $100,000 worth of land and,
upon divorce, the husband receives all the stock and the wife all the
land, the transaction is a non-4axable "division" of the community
property. 29 At first glance, this treatment seems wrong, for if the husband and wife each owned a onehalf interest in the land and the stock
before the division, the division appears to involve an exchange by
the husband of 'his one-half interest in the land for -his wife's one-half
interest in the stock, and vice versa. Justification for non-taxability
may be found in the nature of the spouses' ownership of community
property. 30 Unlike the common law kinds of joint ownership, ownership of community property attaches to particular assets only upon the
happening of some dramatic event, such as divorce or the death of
a spouse, or a transfer of some of the property. At that time onehalf of the property is regarded as belonging to each spouse. In the
case of divorce, each spouse's ownership interest in the community
property is identified with particular assets only when the property is
divided, at which time (at least if the division is equal, or nearly so)
each spouse is viewed as receiving property he has always owned. The
basis of each community asset thus received is its basis to the community.3 1 While this explanation may account for the tax-free treatment
of divisions of community property, it cannot apply to equal divisions
of jointly owned non-community property, which also seem to be tax2
free.
29. The case most often cited for the proposition that a division of community
property is not a taxable event is Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). Under
principles established in later cases, however, the division in Walz would have been
taxable at least in part. Other cases holding that a division of community property
was non-taxable are Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1965); Osceola
Heard Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1953); Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 403 (1949).
30. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 194-95.
31. Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403, 430 (1949).
32. &_g., Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1973)
(semble), affd mem., 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1412 (1974);
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Although an equal division of community property upon divorce is
not a taxable event, a number of cases have held that community prop-

erty divisions have involved taxable sales or exchanges.

One well-

established exception to the general rule of non-taxability involves a

tra fer by one spouse of some of his separate property in exchange
for some of the other spouse's community property.

For example, if

the parties have $100,000 worth of community property and, upon divorce, the husband receives all the community property and transfers
$50,000 worth of his separate property to the wife, the transaction
is clearly a taxable exchange of $50,000 worth of the husband's separate property for the wife's interest in the community property. 33 The

same principles apply if the wife receives part of her share of the community property and exchanges the rest for some of the husband's sep-

arate property. Such a transaction is taxable at least in part; 34 the difCofield v. Koehler, 207 F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962); cf. Edith M. Gerlach, 55 T.C.
156 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 2 (holding division of jointly held property taxable, citing cases holding community property divisions taxable); Rev. Rul. 74347, 1974 INT. Ray. BULL. No. 29, at 6.
In Rev. Rul. 74-347, supra, the Service takes the position that the award to the wife
of more than one-half of the property owned jointly by the spouses is a taxable "exchange" of the excess for the wife's marital rights. The basis of the excess property
is determined by multiplying the basis of all the jointly owned property received by
the wife by a fraction, the numerator of which is the value of the "excess" jointly
owned property transferred and the denominator of which is the value of all jointly
owned property transferred. In order to prevent giving tax effect to depreciation in
personal assets, the basis of jointly owned property in this formula is reduced to the
fair market value of the property in the case of property whose basis exceeds its value.
If placing property in the joint names of the husband and wife will not encourage
the divorce court to give the wife more property than it would if all the property were
in the husband's name-and this should be the case in Missouri, where the statute directs the court to disregard title-joint ownership is best for temporary marriages, since
one-half the property can be transferred tax-free under this Revenue Ruling.
The tax-free nature of divisions of property held as joint tenants or as tenants by the
entirety is inconsistent with the estate and gift tax treatment of such property, particularly real property. Under the estate tax, joint property is usually included in the estate
of the spouse who paid for it, and the other spouse's interest is disregarded. INT. REV.
CoDE OF 1954, § 2040. The creation of a joint tenancy in real property is disregarded
for gift tax purposes, unless the parties elect otherwise. Id. § 2515(a). Thus, under
the estate and gift taxes, realty purchased by the husband is treated as his property regardless of title's having been taken jointly.
33. Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65, 70 (1954) (transaction in which husband received nearly all of community property, in exchange for note and borrowed cash, held
to be "virtual sale of [wife's] interest in certain of the community assets for a consideration").
34. Royce L. Showalter, 33 CCH Tax CL Mem. 192 (1974); Jean L. May, 33
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 256 (1974); Grant R. Bishop, 55 T.C. 720 (1971), acquiesced
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ficulty lies in determining which part of the community property has
been exchanged for separate property and which part has been divided.

Suppose, for example, that the parties own $100,000 worth of community property and that the wife receives $40,000 worth of the community property and $10,000 worth of the husband's separate property.

It is evident that this transaction is a taxable exchange of $10,000 worth
of the husband's separate property for $10,000 worth of the wife's
share of the community property. The wife's amount realized is

clearly $10,000, but what is her basis in the community property she
"sold?"

To answer this question, one must deoide which $10,000

worth of community property was sold. The cases do not furnish much
guidance on -this point. 5 A reasonable allocation by the parties of the

purchase price to particular items of community property will probably
be respected, not because there is any strong reason for doing so but
because there is no good reason for doing anything else. 0

One Tax

Court case holds that the transfer of some separate property in connection with a community property division makes the entire transaction
taxable; 7 this seems questionable.
in, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 1; Maurine DeWolfe Brown, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 948
(1953).
35. In Royce L. Showalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974), the wife received
a $10,000 note from her husband in connection with a division of community property.
The Tax Court held that the wife had sold to her husband her interest in the accounts
receivable of the husband's medical practice. The face amount of the accounts receivable was $10,910.40; one-half this amount was determined to be the wife's amount realized (and therefore, since the receivables had a zero basis, her gain). The taxpayer
argued that the Commissioner had not shown that the $10,000 note was payment for
the receivables, but the court, noting that the taxpayer had offered no evidence to support any other position, held that the taxpayer had sold her interest in the receivables.
Perhaps the similarity in amount between the note and the receivables was what convinced the court that the receivables, rather than something else, had been sold. Since
gain was assessed on only one-half the receivables, the Showalter opinion leaves
$4544.80 of the note unaccounted for.
36. The interests of the husband and wife in determining which property has been
sold in a case like Showalter are not identical, for the husband will ordinarily want
the payment attributed to low-basis property (to increase his basis) while the wife will
prefer to attribute the payment to high-basis property (to reduce or eliminate her gain).
There may, therefore, be some reason to accept an allocation reached in arm's length
bargaining. The situation is similar in principle to that in which part of the purchase
price of a going business is allocated to the seller's covenant not to compete. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967); J. Leonard Schmitz,
51 T.C. 306 (1968). But see Enid P. Mirsky, 56 T.C. 664 (1971), acquiesced in,
1972-2 CuM. BULL. 2; Edith M. Gerlach, 55 T.C. 156 (1970), acquiesced it, 19711 Cum. BuLr. 2 (principles of covenant-not-to-compete cases inapplicable to cases involving classification of periodic payments as alimony or property settlement).
37. C.C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), affd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
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Whether a division of community property can be taxable even if
no separate property is exchanged is not clear. The courts have con-

sistently said that the general rule of non-taxability applies where -the
parties divide the property "equally" or at least "attempt. . . in good
faith to achieve an equal division."'8 These statements necessarily im-

ply that an unequal division is taxable, although why this should be
so is uncertain.

If the laws of the jurisdiction -involved provide that

the wife is to receive a "just" share of the community property upon
divorce, the division of the property should be tax-free even if for

some reason a "just" share is more or less than one-half.3 9 A number
of cases have said that the taxability of a community property division
turns upon whether the parties' "intent" was to make a taxable "bar-

gain and sale" rather than a tax-free "division."40 One case has even
38. Id. at 913 ("If there were simply a division of the community estate, as petitioner contends, the property would have been equally divided, or at least an attempt
would have been made in good faith to achieve an equal division"). See, e.g., Clifford
H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 290, 293 (1965) ("where the facts indicated that
the parties divided the community property equally, or at least made an honest effort
to divide the property equally depending upon its value, this Court has held that such
agreement does not constitute a taxable transaction"); Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C 65,
69 (1954) ("This transaction . . . was [not] an out and out division of the community
property with the wife and husband each taking certain items in kind and of an
approximately equal value"); Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403, 430 (1949)
("Nothing suggests the idea that the property was not divided as equally as possible").
But cf. Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718, 720 (1935) ("Even if, in the division of property between husband and wife when the marriage is dissolved, the husband gets the
worst end of the bargain ... the husband could not claim a deductible loss").
39. See, e.g., TEx. FAMmTY CODE § 3.63 (1971):
In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the
estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having
due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.
In a true community property jurisdiction, the provision for each spouse's testamentary disposition of one-half the community property may support an argument that each
spouse's vested interest in the property is one-half, even if the provisions relating to
divorce provide for a "just" division. But if non-community property states such as
Missouri are held to be subject to the community property tax rules because of provisions for just divisions of "marital property," there would be no reasonable basis for
arguing that the wife's "vested" interest is one-half rather than whatever she in fact
is awarded.
40. Clifford H. Wren, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 290, 293 (1965) ("Nowhere in the
agreement do we find words indicating that a 'sale' or 'purchase' was contemplated
by the parties"); Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 CCH Tax CL Mem. 856, 857 (1953)
("The intent of the parties will aid us in determining whether there was a sale or a
division of community property....
[Clertain statements . . . unequivocally express
the parties' intent as of the time they made the division of the property"). Contra,
Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65, 68 (1954) ("We think the transaction before us differs
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described tax-free divisions as "amicable," suggesting that taxability
depends upon the ferocity with which the spouses bargain. 4 ' The Tax

Court once held a community property division taxable because it was2
agreed to by the parties rather than imposed upon them by -the court,'

a holding that is clearly wrong, for the case most often cited for the
proposition that community property divisions are tax-free involved a

settlement agreement.43

An unequal division of community property

may be taxable in part if it can be shown that the husband transferred

some of his interest in the44property to the wife in exchange for the
release of her support rights.
Neither the rules governing the tax treatment of -transfers of appre-

ciated non-community property nor those concerning the tax treatment of community property divisions are entirely satisfactory. The
effect of -the Davis case in non-community property jurisdictions is to
tax the husband on a transaction that deprives him of property,
a somewhat odd result. 45 Taxpayers in community property jurisdicfrom a mere division or partition of the community property, and this is true despite
the language used in the settlement agreement and the avoidance, whether calculated
or not, of the usual verbiage connoting a sale").
41. Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856, 858 (1953): "From
the record as a whole we can only conclude that petitioner and her former husband
did not bargain and sell the community property between themselves, but amicably divided it by a separation agreement and divorce."
42. C.C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908, 913 (1946), afrd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947):
The facts disclose that the agreement was voluntarily entered into by the parties, that the agreement expressly provided that its validity should not depend
on court action, and that the only reference which the divorce decree made
to the property settlement was to observe that it had been made and that "this
Decree does not impair, affect, nor modify said agreement." We are therefore unable to conclude that the transaction between petitioner and his then
wife constituted a partition of their community property by order of the divorce court. To the contrary, it appears that the parties to the agreement
chose to settle their property rights by bargain and sale rather than by partition or division.
43. Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
44. Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836
(1964); Harry L. Swaim, 50 T.C. 302 (1968). Davis involved the release of inchoate
marital property rights rather than support rights, but this difference is without significance. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Davis supported its holding that the marital property rights in question were unlike the wife's rights in a community property jurisdiction by noting that Mrs. Davis' rights "do not differ significantly from the husband's
obligation of support and alimony." 370 U.S. at 70.
45. In one of the earliest cases dealing with the Davis problem, the Board of Tax
Appeals observed: "To hold that a man has realized income by giving up a substantial
portion of his property seems to us unreasonable .... " L.W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A. 933,
941 (1940), rev'd, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
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flons at least have the opportunity to sort out their marital property
without paying a tax, but if they stray from the clearly tax-free transacion-an, equal division of community property unaccompanied by
transfers of separate property-they run the risk that their transaction
also may be taxable, to an extent that is difficult to predict. 46 Missouri
taxpayers and their advisers have an added burden, for, in addition to
one or the other of the aforementioned problems, they cannot even
be certain whether the community property rules or the non-community property rules apply to divisions of "marital property" under the
new Missouri divorce law.
B.

Is Missouria Community PropertyState?

At first glance, the suggestion that the marital property provisions
of the Missouri divorce law may make Missouri a "community property

state," even for the limited purpose of taxing dispositions of property
upon divorce, seems absurd.

Although the divorce law's definition of

"marital property" is similar to -the usual definitions of community
property,"' the marital property provisions have no effect outside the

context of divorce.48 The new law does not affect each spouse's right
to control his own property and to dispose of it during life or at death.
46. Professor Schwartz observes that "one has some difficulty differentiating" the
facts of Frances R. Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935) (holding a community property division non-taxable), from the facts of Jessie Lee Edwards, 22 T.C. 65 (1954) (holding
a similar division taxable). Schwartz, supra note 23, at 185.
47. Compare the Missouri definition of marital property, Mo. Rnv. STAT. §
452.330.2 (Supp. 1973), with the following provisions of the Texas Family Code
(1971):
§ 3.63. Division of Property
In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the
estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having
due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.
§ 5.01. Marital Property Characterized
(a) A spouse's separate property consists of:
(1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage,
(2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise,
or descent, and
(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during
marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during
marriage.
(b) Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.
§ 5.02. Presumption
Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is
presumed to be community property.
48. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.2 (Supp. 1973).
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Since this is so, the marital property provisions can be viewed as directing, in a somewhat roundabout way, the transfer of property from
one spouse to the other, rather than the division of jointly owned property. 4' While there is much to be said for this view, there is some
case authority for treating property transfers under statutes no more
similar -to community property statutes than Missouri's as non-taxable
divisions. The possibility that dispositions of Missouri marital property
will be held to be non-taxable must, therefore, be taken seriously.
The blurring of the distinction between the community property and
common law systems of ownership began with Swanson v. Wiseman, 0

in which a federal district court held, with little analysis, 'that a distribution of appreciated stock to a wife pursuant to an Oklahoma divorce
decree was part of a non-taxable division of property between coowners. Five years after Swanson another Oklahoma divorce case
reached the Tax Court, which held in George F. Collins, Jr.5 1 (Collins
49. Cf. Fowler & Krauskopf, supra note 10.
50. 61-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 1 9264 (W.D. Okla. 1961).
The statute authorizing the property provisions of the divorce decree in Swanson was
OELA. STAi. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1951), which provided:
When a divorce shall be granted by reason of the fault or aggression of the
husband, the wife shall be restored to her maiden name if she so desires, and
also to all the property, lands, tenements, hereditaments owned by her before
marriage or acquired by her in her own right after such marriage, and not
previously disposed of, and shall be allowed such alimony out of the husband's
real and personal property as the court shall think reasonable, having due regard to the value of his real and personal estate at the time of said divorce;
which alimony may be allowed to her in real or personal property, or both,
or by decreeing to her such sum of money, payable either in gross or in installments, as the court may deem just and equitable. As to such property,
whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired by the parties jointly
during their marraige, whether the title thereto be in either or both of said
parties, the court shall make such division between the parties respectively as
may appear just and reasonable, by a division of the property in kind, or by
setting the same apart to one of the parties, and requiring the other thereof
to pay such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and just division
thereof. In case of a finding by the court, that such divorce should be
granted on account of the fault or aggression of the wife, the court may set
apart to the husband and for the support of the children, issue of the marriage, such portion of the wife's separate estate as may be proper.
Although the Government's position in Swanson was that the division was tax-free, the
Government has consistently sought taxable treatment in later cases. In Rev. Rul. 74347, 1974 Irr. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 6, the Service stated that property is co-owned
where "state property law is found to be similar to community property law," citing
the Collinscases.
51. 46 T.C. 461 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated and remanded,
393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
The relevant state statute was OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961), which is
identical to that quoted in note 50 supra.
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1) that an Oklahoma wife's "general interest in all property acquired
. . . during the marriage"52 did not prevent taxation of a transfer

of appreciated stock to her. The Oklahoma wife was said to have
no "vested" interest in the property and to have "no right to a partic-

ular item of the . . .property." 53 In Collins v. Commissioner4 (Collins II) the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Finding
that such "traditional elements of co-ownership" as "descendible interest, right to control and disposition of property and vested interest"
were lacking, the court held that Davis required taxation of the trans55
fer.

Nine months after the decision in Collins II, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruled in Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Commission56 that the transfer
which the Tax Court and Tenth Circuit had held taxable in Collins I
and Collins II was a non-taxable division for purposes of the Oklahoma

income tax. The court described the wife's interest in property "acquired during married life as the result of industry, economy and busi52. 46 T.C. at 474. Unlike the Missouri wife, who acquires an interest in marital
property simply by being married, the Oklahoma wife must contribute her "efforts, industry, or skills" to the acquisition or enhancement of the property to have an interest.
Her services need not be performed outside the home, but they have to go beyond
"those of an ordinary housewife." Ernest H. Mills, 54 T.C. 608, 617 (1970), aff'd,
442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971). While this difference is important in determining
whether a particular wife has an interest in the property acquired during the marriage,
it seems irrelevant in deciding whether her interest, once acquired, is "vested."
53. 46 T.C. at 474. This characteristic of Oklahoma law does not support the Tax
Court's holding, since wives in community property states do not have a right to particular items of community ploperty.
54. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd,
412 F.2d 211 (l0th Cir. 1969).
55. Id. at 357-58. The same court had previously held in Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964), that Davis applied to property transfers under
Colorado law. In Collins II the Tenth Circuit found it "difficult . . .to see any distinction between Oklahoma and Colorado law sufficient to justify a different characterization of the property division." 388 F.2d at 357. In Collins v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 296-97 (Okla. 1968), however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
found an "obvious disparity" between Colorado and Oklahoma law. The differences
were said to be first, that under Colorado law an award to the wife "is dependent upon
extent of her contribution, respective financial condition of the parties, their conduct,
probable future earnings and other pertinent circumstances," and secondly, that "all
matters of alimony and property division are within the discretion of the trial court
under Colorado Law." id. at 297. It is difficult to see how these differences justify
characterization of the Oklahoma wife's interest as more vested than that of the Colorado wife. See note 74 infra.
56. 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968). But see Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365 (Okla.
1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
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0' 7
ness ability" as being "similar in conception to community property.
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in Collins
11 and vacated the court of appeals' judgment, remanding for further
consideration in light of the Oklahoma state court decision.56 On remand, the Tenth Circuit held59 (Collins 111) that the transfer was, after all, a non-taxable division. The court rejected the Government's
invitation to disregard state labels and to inquire into the nature of
the Oklahoma wife's "ownership," ruling that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's description of the wife as a "part owner" made it unnecessary
"to search state law for indications of other factors that might signify
the nature of the wife's property interest." 60
A Colorado statute similar to the Oklahoma statutes involved in
Swanson and the Collins cases has also been held to give 'the wife
a "vested" interest in the property of the marriage. Although the
Tenth Circuit had held in Pulliam v. Commissioner"' that Davis made
Colorado property divisions taxable, a federal district court in Imel v.
United States6" was sufficiently impressed by Collins III and the simi57. 446 P.2d at 295.
58. 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
59. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
60. Id. at 212.
61. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964). The statute involved was COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-1-5 (1953), which provided:
At all times after the filing of a complaint in an action for divorce, the court
in term time, or the judge thereof in vacation, may make such order for the
care and custody of the minor children of the parties as the circumstances
of the case may warrant, and such court or judge may grant alimony and
counsel fees pendente lite to the wife. When a divorce has been granted the
court may make such order and decree providing for the payment of alimony
and maintenance of the wife and minor children or either of them as may
be reasonable and just, and may require security to be given for the payment
of such alimony, or enforce the payment thereof by execution or imprisonment, or may decree a division of property. The remarriage of the former
wife shall relieve the former husband from further payment of alimony to her,
but such remarriage shall not relieve the former husband from the provisions
of any judgment or decree or order providing for the support of any minor
children.
62. 73-2 U.S. TAx CAs. 19617 (D. Colo. 1973). The Imel opinion is, to say the
least, confusing. The court at one point described the Colorado wife's interest as "inchoate." Since, under Davis, the issue in these cases is whether the wife's interest is
"inchoate" rather than "vested," this finding seems to require a holding that the transfer was taxable. The court apparently felt that the Tax Court's decision in Irving 3.
Hayutin, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1972), supported its holding, although Hayutin
in fact held that a wife's interest under Colorado law did not amount to co-ownership.
The Imel court seems to have attached considerable importance to the provision in the
Colorado statute for awarding the property in such proportions "as may be fair and
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larity between the Colorado 63 and Oklahoma statutes concerning dis-

position of property upon divorce to certify the question of the taxability of a transfer of property under a settlement agreement to the Colorado Supreme Court. That court declined to answer the district

oourt's certified question directly, noting that it was "probably not
proper" to resolve a question of federal taxation.

court
wife's
to be
"vest"

4

The Colorado

did, however, endeavor to explain the nature of the Colorado
interest in her husband's property. The wife's rights were said
"completely inchoate" until a divorce action was begun, and to
at that time. 65 This "vesting" seems to consist of ,the wife's ob-

taining the right to prevent the husband from disposing of the property

after the divorce aotion is initiated. 66 The ability of a wife to prevent
her husband from giving away the marital property during divorce

proceedings hardly seems a sufficient basis for distinguishing Davis.
equitable," since it italicized that phrase in quoting the statute. But a provision for
giving the wife a "fair and equitable" share of the property does not in any way support a holding that Davis is inapplicable, for, while several community property states
do have similar provisions, the Delaware statute examined by the Supreme Court in
Davis provided that the wife should be given a "reasonable" share of the property.
63. The statute involved in Imel was COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5 (1963),
which read as follows:
(1) (a) At all times after the filing of a complaint, whether before or after
the issuance of a divorce decree, the court may make such orders, if any, as
the circumstances of the case may warrant for:
(b) Custody of minor children;
(c) Care and support of children dependent upon the parent or parents for
support;
(d) Alimony;
(e) Suit money, court costs, and attorney fees; and
(f) Any other matters (except division of property) in controversy between
the parties.
(2) At the time of the issuance of a divorce decree, or at some reasonable
time thereafter as may be set by the court at the time of the issuance of said
divorce decree, on application of either party, the court may make such orders, if any, as the circumstances of the case may warrant relative to division
of property, in such proportions as may be fair and equitable.
The court's opinion does not indicate that it perceived any significant difference between this statute and the one under which Pulliam was decided.
64. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 517 P.2d 1331, 1334
(Colo. 1974).
65. Id. at 1335.
66. Id. The court described the rights of the wife as becoming, upon the filing
of the divorce action, "analogous to those of a wife who can establish a resulting trust,"
id., and said that "[ulpon the filing of the action the court may protect this vested
interest of the wife pending the division order, even though the property to be transferred to her has not yet been determined." Id.
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Since the Colorado wife is not a "co-owner" of her husband's property
even in theory until a divorce action is begun, Colorado seems clearly

not to have a community property system in any meaningful sense of
the term. In explaining its conclusion that a Delaware wife's rights
were "inchoate" and less than "co-ownership," the Supreme Court in
Davis examined the wife's rights as they existed throughout the marriage, not during the divorce proceedings. 67 Nevertheless, the district
court in Imel held that, in view of the Colorado Supreme Court's description of Mrs. Imel's rights as "vested," the transfers involved in that

case were not taxable.

8

The reasoning of the Collins III and Imel opinions is not persuasive.

The willingness of the Tenth Circuit and the Colorado District Court
to give controlling effect to the state courts' descriptions of the wife's
rights as vested is inconsistent with Davis60 and with the Supreme

Court's explanations of the effect to be given state law in federal tax
cases. 70 Furthermore, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has qualified its
description of the wife's interest as "similar in conception to community property," saying in Sanditen v. Sanditen7 1 that a "wife does not
67. 370 U.S. at 70:
The taxpayer's analogy, however, stumbles on its own premise, for the inchoate rights granted a wife in her husband's property by the Delaware law
do not even remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The wife has no
interest-passive or active--over the management or disposition of her husband's personal property. Her rights are not descendable, and she must survive him to share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the marriage
she shares in the property only to such extent as the court deems "reasonable."
68. Imel v. United States, 74-1 U.S. TAx CAS. 9459 (D. Colo. 1974).
69. See note 67 supra.
70. In Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), the Court held that a lease of oil
and gas interests was not a "sale" for purposes of federal taxation even though, under
the law of Texas, the lessee became the "owner" of the interest. The Court described
the relationship between state and federal law in the following terms: "The state law
creates legal interests but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be
taxed." Id. at 110. The Court later said much the same thing in Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940): "State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed." The
Collins III and Imel courts, instead of inquiring into the nature of the rights created
by state law, in effect let the states control a question of federal taxation simply by
describing the wife's rights as "vested." This characterization was no more entitled to
controlling effect than was the Texas law's description of the oil and gas lessee as an
"owner" in Harmel. See Swihart, Federal Taxation of New Mexico Community Property, 3 NAT. REsouacEs J. 104, 160-64 (1963).
71. 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972). The plaintiff in Sanditen was a wife who sought
to set aside her husband's gratuitous transfer of jointly acquired property. The wife's

Vol. 1974:227]

TAX EFFECTS OF UNIFORM DIVORCE ACT

247

have joint ownership in jointly acquired property . . . for if she did

that would return this jurisdiction to a community property state which
was repealed by the legislature in 1949. " 72

Now that even the Okla-

homa Supreme Court does not regard the wife's interest as "vested"
(at least before a divorce action is begun), it may be doubted that
Collins III is still the law, even in the Tenth Circuit. 73
Swanson, Collins III, and imel could be used to support an argument that property divisions under the Missouri divorce law are tax-

free, for the Oklahoma and Colorado statutes involved in those cases
do not differ in any material way from the Missouri marital property

provisions.7 4 But other courts have reached a different conclusion un-

interest was said not to "vest" until a divorce action was begun, although in Collins
v. Oklahoma Tax Commission the same court had said that the wife's vested interest
"is exercisable by the wife at any time during marriage, even though she is not entitled
to divorce." 446 P.2d at 297.
72. 496 P.2d at 367. See also McDaniel v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 499 P.2d
1391, 1393 (Okla. 1972) (holding that a transfer of jointly acquired property from husband to wife was subject to Oklahoma gift tax because wife's interest was not vested.
The court said of Collins: "We made several pronouncements in Collins not necessary
to reach the result reached").
73. In Wiles v. Commissioner, 74-2 U.S. TAx CAs. f 9530 (10th Cir. 1974), the
Tenth Circuit, after describing the Collins cases, said that "the Oklahoma position is
btill troublesome." The court described the Oklahoma law as "in a state of flux," citing
Sanditen and McDaniel v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 499 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1972).
74. Despite the similarities, the law of Oklahoma, at least, may differ sufficiently
from Missouri law to support an argument that cases involving transfers of property under Missouri law are distinguishable from Collins III, although the distinctions are
rather weak. For one thing, the rights of an Oklahoma wife in jointly acquired property are not completely cut off if she dies before her husband; if the couple has no
children and if the wife dies intestate (or the husband elects to take against the will),
one-half of the jointly acquired property remaining at the husband's death goes to the
wife's heirs, provided the husband dies intestate. OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 84, § 213
(1970); see Payne's Heirs v. Seay, 478 P.2d 889 (Okla. 1970); In re Laug's Estate,
189 Okla. 516, 118 P.2d 228 (1941). The Tenth Circuit held in Collins II that §
213 did not affect the Davis issue, since it was "not a rule of property but . . . solely
a rule of descent and distribution." 388 F.2d at 356. Furthermore, divisions of jointly
acquired Oklahoma property are made without regard to the wife's need, e.g., Collins
v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353, 356 (10th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215
(1968), while in Missouri the wife's need is one of several factors to be considered
in determining a "just" division of the marital property, Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.330.1(3)
(Supp. 1973). In Davis the Supreme Court seems to have regarded the necessity of
considering the wife's need as a factor supporting characterization of her rights as inchoate. 370 U.S. at 70. See also Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56 (1973), acquiesced
in, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 39, at 6, aff'd, 74-2 U.S. TAX CAs.
9530 (10th Cir.
1974). In at least one community property state, Washington, the wife's need is expressly made a factor to be considered by the court in making a "just and equitable"
division of the parties' community and non-community property. WASH. REV. CoDE
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der nearly identical statutes. In Wallace v. United States" a federal
district court held that an Iowa statute giving a divorced wife the right
to share in the property to such extent "as shall be right"70 did not
give the wife "significant meaningful attributes of ownership." '77 Finding the Iowa law "indistinguishable in any meaningful way" from the
Delaware law examined by the Supreme Court in Davis, -the Wallace
court held that the transfer in question was taxable. Collins III was
said to be "incorrectly decided, or at least distinguishable. 78 1 The
Eighth Circuit, in affirming, approved most of the district court's reasoning, although the appellate court refrained from expressing disagreement with Collins III, finding that case "clearly distinguishable
79
on its facts.
The Okkhoma law analyzed in the Collins cases is similar to the

law of Kansas, from which the Oklahoma law was derived. 0 In Richard E. Wiles, Jr.81 the Tax Court held that, notwithstanding some lanANN. § 26.09.080 (Supp. 1973). In view of this provision, it is hard to see how the
"needs of the wife" factor can be used to distinguish community property from noncommunity property jurisdictions.
75. 309 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Iowa 1970), afld, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971).

76.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 598.14 (1950):

When a divorce is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to
the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be

right.

Subsequent changes may be made by it in these respects when circumstances render them expedient.
77. 309 F. Supp. at 761.
78. Id. at 760.
79. 439 F.2d at 760. The most significant distinction seems to be that the Oklahoma wife has a right to share in the jointly acquired property irrespective of her
needs, while the Iowa wife does not. See note 74 supra.
80. See Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353, 357 n.9 (10th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968). The statute in question was KAN. STAT. ANN. § 601610(b) (1967):
Division of Property. The decree shall divide the real and personal property
of the parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by
either spouse in his or her own right after marriage, or acquired by their joint
efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, either by a division of the property
in kind, or by setting the same or a part thereof over to one of the spouses
and requiring either to pay such sum as may be just and proper, or by ordering a sale of the same under such conditions as the court may prescribe and
dividing the proceeds of such sale.
81. 60 T.C. 56 (1973), acquiesced in, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 39, at 6 (reviewed
by the court, with three dissents), aff'd, 74-2 U.S. TAx CAs. 9530 (10th Cir. 1974).
Although the Tax Court had held in Collins I that the Oklahoma wife's interest in
jointly acquired property was not "vested" for purposes of taxing the husband upon the
transfer of appreciated property to the wife, it described the Oklahoma wife's interest
as "vested" in two cases in which the issue was classification of payments by a husband
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guage in the Kansas cases describing the wife's interest as a property
right, a transfer of appreciated property under 'the Kansas statute was

taxable.8 2

Like the Eighth Circuit in Wallace, the Tax Court pur-

ported to distinguish Collins III.8 3 Much of the Wiles opinion can,
however, be read as disapproving the reasoning of Collins III: the

Tax Court said that, in cases not appealable to the Tenth Circuit, it
would not be bound by "mere 'tags' of State law;

'8 4

it expressed its

continuing belief in the soundness of the reasoning of Collins i;85 and
it noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held, in cases decided
after Collins III, that the Oklahoma wife's interest in jointly acquired
property was not an ownership interest.8 6 Wiles was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit, which, like the Tax Court, purported to distinguish Collins JJJ.87

as alimony or as a property settlement. Lewis B. Jackson, Jr., 54 T.C. 125 (1970);
Ernest H. Mills, 54 T.C. 608 (1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971). See also
West v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 563 (5th
Cir. 1973); Irving J. Hayutin, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1972). The issue in the
alimony cases may be whether the wife has an interest, rather than whether she has
a vested interest. See text accompanying notes 112-21 infra. Still, the failure of the
courts in the appreciated property cases to cite the alimony cases is, like the incident
of the dog in the nighttime, curious.
82. 60 T.C. at 61-63. See also id. at 64 (Goffe, J., dissenting).
83. The court said that it doubted whether Collins III was even analogous, since
under the Kansas statute the wife could be awarded some of the husband's separate
property as well as jointly acquired property. This is an unconvincing argument. It
is difficult to see how a provision for divesting the husband of his separate property
makes the wife's interest in the jointly acquired property any less "vested" than it
would have been in the absence of such a provision. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.09.080 (Supp. 1973) (providing for an award of separate as well as community
property to the wife).
84. 60 T.C. at 63 n.4.
85. Id. at 63.
86. Id. at 62. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
87. 74-2 U.S. TAX CAs. 9530 (10th Cir. 1974).
The court's holding that the Kansas wife's interest in marital property is not "vested"
seems to have been based primarily on the court's belief that a wife whose interest
amounted to co-ownership would have a right to something more than a "just and
equitable" share of the property upon divorce. This position is simply wrong. Several
community property states have similar provisions. See notes 47 & 63 supra. The Oklahoma law involved in the Collins cases provided for the award of a "just and reasonable" division of jointly acquired property; no rational distinction between this provision and the law of Kansas can be based upon the language of the statutes. It is unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit chose to "distinguish" Collins III rather than overrule
it, for as long as that case remains on the books taxpayers can be expected to persist
in arguing that property transfers in states with statutes similar to Oklahoma's are taxfree.
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Missouri taxpayers for whom such treatment is advantageous can

be expected to argue that divisions of Missouri marital property are
tax-free, citing Collins III and Imel. But the better view is that Missouri marital property divisions are taxable. All the reasons given by
the Supreme Court in Davis for holding that Delaware law gave the
wife no rights comparable to the rights of a wife -ina community property state apply with equal force in Missouri. The most significant
right of the wife in community property jurisdictions-that of disposing

of one-half the community property by will if she predeceases her husband 5s-has no parallel in Missouri.

A wife who can dispose of one-

half the marital property by will can more reasonably be regarded as
a part owner of that property than can the Missouri wife, whose "marital property" rights mean nothing if she is not divorced or separated.

Furthermore, the wife in a community property state has, at least in
theory, a modest amount of protection against her husband's dissipating the community property (for example, by spending it on "dissolute
women"). 89 The Missouri marital property provisions afford no coinparable protection. The Missouri provisions do give the wife something more than she had at common law, but rights are not "vested"
merely because they -are new.9"
The process of deciding whether a marital property statute gives
a wife an ownership interest by comparing the wife's rights under the
statute with the rights of wives in community property states is not

entirely satisfactory. The trouble with the process is that community
property jursidictions do not necessarily give wives rights much more
88. But see note 92 infra (concerning the law of New Mexico).
89. See W. DE FUNm & M. VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF CoMMuNrIY PROPERTY §
120 (2d ed. 1971).
90. Cf. George F. Collins, Jr., 46 T.C. 461, 465 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir.
1969). Missouri marital property differs from community property in the way in
which the wife's rights are acquired, for whether property is community property depends upon the law of the jurisdiction of the parties' domicile at the time the property
was acquired, e.g., Estate of Jeanne Lepoutre, 62 T.C. 84 (1974), while the Missouri
marital property provisions apply to all the property of the spouses, wherever acquired.
A wife can, therefore, acquire rights to marital property simply by moving to Missouri.
Cf. AM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1973) (for purposes of disposing of property on divorce, property acquired by either spouse outside of Arizona is deemed to
be community property if it would have been community property if acquired in Arizona). Marital property is in this respect similar to California "quasi community property," which is treated for federal tax purposes as separate property. See Schwartz,
supranote 23, at 184.

Vol. 1974:227]

TAX EFFECTS OF UNIFORM DIVORCE ACT

substantial than the rights of wives in common law jurisdictions. New
Mexico, which has long been treated as a community property state
for federal income tax purposes, 9 1 did not until recently give -a wife
who predeceases her husband the right to dispose of any of the community property by will.92 The wife's right to prevent her husband
from dissipating the community property may, as a practical matter,
be largely offset by the traditional view of the husband as the "manager of the community," with the right to dispose of the property as
he sees fit.93 This lack of significant differences between the community property jurisdictions (particularly New Mexico) and other
states suggests that the wife is treated as a co-owner of community

property more because the states have said she is a co-owner than because they have given her any real ownership rights. 94 If this is so,

the tax-free nature of community property divisions is an historical
anomaly, which should be confined to the eight traditional community

property states. 95
91. See generally Swihart, supra note 70, at 150-69.
92. See Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). See generally 1 A.
WINARD, LANDMARK PAPERS ON ESTATE PLANNING, WILLS, ESTATES AND TRusTs 308
(1968); Swihart, supra note 70. The New Mexico law was changed in 1973 to give
the wife the same interest as her husband in the community property. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 29-1-9 (Supp. 1973).
93. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHAN, supra note 89, at § 113 et seq. The new
Texas Family Code provides that "each spouse has the sole management, control, and
disposition of the community property that he or she would have owned if single."
TEx. FAMILY CODE art. 5.22 (1973).
94. Compare de Funiak and Vaughan, who, in arguing that the Spanish community
property system from which the American community property systems were derived
gave the wife "an equal and present ownership of half of the community property,"
rely on statements of various authorities to the effect that the wife was an "owner,"
rather than on any showing of substantial ownership rights in the wife. W. DE FUNIAK
& M. VAUGHAN, supra note 89, at §§ 96, 97. For an analysis of the history of federal
taxation of community property, see Swihart, supra note 70.
95. In the early 1940's, several states adopted "community property" laws in order
to obtain the tax advantages of community property for their citizens. In Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944), the Supreme Court passed up the opportunity
to reappraise the issue of the validity of the tax treatment of community property, "distinguishing" the new Oklahoma law from other community property systems on the
ground that the Oklahoma law applied only to spouses who so elected. The Bureau
of Internal Revenue then ruled that new "mandatory" community property systems
would permit income-splitting. See I.T. 3782, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 84. The repeal of
the new community property laws following the enactment of the joint return provisions in the Revenue Act of 1948, see ch. 168, §§ 301, 303, 62 Stat. 110 (now INT.
RLv. CoiE OF 1954, §§ 2, 6013), laid to rest the possibility that the courts might deny
community property tax treatment to a "community property" system enacted to obtain
tax benefits. See Swihart, supra note 70, at 124-25. It is clear that, unlike the corn-
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On balance, there are several reasons for thinking that, if the question is litigated, Missouri marital property divisions will be held to be
taxable. First, ,the Eighth Circuit, which is likely to be the first court
of appeals to deal with the issue, has held transfers under the law of
Iowa, which does not differ materially from the Missouri law, to be
taxable. Secondly, the opinions in Wallace and Wiles are considerably
more persuasive than those in Swanson, Collins III, and Imel. Finally,
the Tenth Circuit will soon have a chance to reconsider Collins Iff,00
and there is reason to hope that it will overrule its unfortunate holding
in that case.9"
I.

ALIMONY

The tax advantages of income-splitting between husband and wife
oan survive divorce. Payments described in sections 71(a) and (c),
which will be referred to as "alimony, 0' 8 are deductible by -the husband99 and taxable to the wife. 100 If, as is frequently the case, the
wife is in a lower tax bracket than ,the husband, treatment of payments
by the husband to the wife as alimony can benefit both parties. 101
Payments must satisfy two kinds of requirements to be deductible
as alimony. First, the payments must meet the formal requirements
of section 71. For example, they must be "periodic" (or, if in discharge of a principal sum, the period of payment must exceed
munity property experiments of the 1940's, potential tax benefits played no part in the
drafting of the Uniform Divorce Act or the new Missouri law. Nowhere in the voluminous literature on either of these statutes is there any indication that the tax effects
of their adoption were considered by anyone.
96. The Government has appealed Imel to the Tenth Circuit. See 6 P-H 1974 FED.
TAxEs
61,004 (announcement of appeal).
97. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit
has passed up one opportunity to overrule Collins III, choosing instead to "distinguish"
that case on rather tenuous grounds. See Wiles v. Commissioner, 74-2 U.S. TAX CAs.
9530 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed in note 87 supra.
98. Although § 71 is entitled "Alimony and Separate Maintenance Payments," that
section does not itself use the term "alimony." "Alimony" will be used in this Article
to mean "payments deductible under section 215," while periodic payments under the
Missouri divorce law will be called "maintenance."
99. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 215. Payments under an alimony trust which are
includible in the wife's income under § 682 are also deductible under § 215.
100. Id. § 71. See also id. § 682 (treatment of payments under an alimony trust).
101. The husband's tax savings may be passed on to the wife in the form of higher
alimony payments than she would receive if the husband were not able to deduct the
payments.
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they must not be characterized as child support pay-

ments in the decree or separation agreement,' 0 3 and they must be received after a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or under

a written separation agreement or decree for support.' 0 4 Secondly,
the payments must be "for support." 0 5

The "support" requirement

means, among other things, that divorced or separated spouses cannot
disguise payments made for purposes unrelated to the wife's supportsuch as the repayment of a loan" 6 or the purchase price of -the wife's
property-as deductible alimony. The distinction between periodic
payments for "support" and other periodic payments has been the subject of an astonishing amount of litigation. The marital property provisions of the new Missouri divorce law should not interfere with qualification of payments under the formal requirements of section 71,
which are largely independent of local law, but the "support" requirement is another story. Under the old law, periodic payments to a wife
who had no property of her own would normally satisfy the "support"
requirement, for there was nothing the payments could be for but "support."10 7 Under the new law, however, there will be cases in which
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(a), 71(c)(2). If payments are part of a principal sum payable over a period of more than ten years, payments are treated as periodic only to the extent of up to 10% of the principal sum each year. Id. § 71(c)(2).
103. Id. § 71(b). The requirement that the terms of the decree fix part of a payment as child support has been strictly construed. The leading case is Commissioner
v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
104. INrT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(a)(1)-(3).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957) provides that payments must be made "because of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obligation to
support which is made specific by the decree, instrument, or agreement" to qualify as
alimony. This language is derived from the legislative history of the alimony provisions; the statute itself does not refer to "support." For an analysis of the origins and
meaning of the support requirement, see Harris, The Federal Income Tax Treatment
of Alimony Payments-The "Support" Requirement of the Regulations, 22 HAsTnNGs
LJ. 53 (1970).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957).
107. See, eg., Marion R. Hesse, 60 T.C. 685 (1973) (holding payment to be alimony primarily because wife had no community property or other claims to property,
other than certain claims of doubtful value). However, a number of courts have dealt
with the "alimony versus property settlement" issue without considering the nature and
extent of the wife's property interests. In effect, these decisions treat payments as "for
property" if the amount of the payment is determined by the amount of property available for distribution, even if all of that property belonged to the husband. See, e.g.,
Lambros v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972) (principal amount of payments
approximately one-half value of property accumulated by parties; divorce decree referred to an "equitable division" of the property); cf. McCombs v. Commissioner, 397
F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968).
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it can be argued that periodic payments purporting to be alimony were
intended to be the purchase price of the wife's interest in the marital
property. Whether a showing that periodic payments were so intended will prevent alimony treatment is uncertain.
One kind of case in which maintenance payments under the new
Missouri divorce law should clearly be fheld to be taxable as alimony is that in which the parties have little or no marital property.
In such a case, maintenance payments should qualify as alimony (assuming the formal requirements of section 71 are satisfied), since
there is no property for which the payments could be consideration.
The maintenance provisions of the new divorce law do represent a
change in the theory underlying payments to the wife, for under prior
law alimony was regarded as payment for the wife's loss of the support
she would have received had divorce not occurred, while maintenance
under the new law is "for support" in the sense that the payments
are for the purpose of supporting -the wife.108 This change should
raise no tax problems, for payments "for support" in either of these
senses can qualify as alimony under section 71.109 Similarly, if there
is marital property but all (or at least a "just" share) of it is awarded
to the wife, maintenance payments should be "for support" because
there is nothing else they could be for. '
The difficult cases will be
those in which -thehusband receives all or most of the marital property
and makes periodic payments to the wife. Suppose, for example, that
parties who have substantial marital property decide, instead of dividing the property more or less equally, to let the husband keep all the
marital property and to provide for maintenance payments to the wife,
perhaps in the hope that the payments will be taxed as alimony. Such
an arrangement is probably permissible as a matter of Missouri law,'
but there is some doubt that it will achieve the desired tax result.
108. See Ruhland, Maintenance and Support, 29 J. Mo. B. 516 (1973).
109. Indeed, payments can be "for support" even if local law does not require a husband to support his wife after divorce. For discussion of the "support" requirement,
see Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); Ruth E. Kern, 55 T.C. 405
(1970); William M. Joslin, Sr., 52 T.C. 231 (1969), aft'd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.
1970); Blanche Curtis Newbury, 46 T.C. 690 (1966), acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM.
BULL. xx; Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949), acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM. BULL.
XX.

110. See, e.g., William M. Joslin, Sr., 52 T.C. 231 (1969), affd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1970); Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968); William F. Hagenloch, 26 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 722 (1967).
111. The Commissioners' Note to § 308, the maintenance provision of the Uniform
Act, from which the Missouri law was derived, states that "[tihe dual intention of this
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The argument against alimony treatment of periodic payments in
a case where the husband receives all or most of the marital property

would run as follows: The marital property provisions give the wife
an interest in property; therefore, the wife who emerges from divorce

proceedings with little or no property must have sold her interest to
her husband, and the periodic payments she receives are not for her

"support" but for her property. The soundness of this argument in
cases where the wife's only interest in property is that given her by
the new Missouri divorce law is the subject of the remainder of this

Article.
The relationship between the alimony problem and the problem of

whether the marital property provisions give the wife a "vested" or
"ownership" interest is unclear. If the marital property provisions are
held to give the wife an interest similar to the wife's interest in com-

munity property, it will be hard to argue for alimony treatment in cases
where the husband receives all the marital property, for it is well-

established that payments for the wife's share of community property
are not alimony.11 2 But it does not necessarily follow -that character-

ization of the wife's interest as "inchoate" or as "less than ownership"
will avoid this problem. Under Davis the inquiry in cases involving
transfers of appreciated property is whether the wife's rights were
"vested" or "inchoate," but in the alimony cases the inquiry may sim-

ply be whether the wife had an interest in the property, not whether
she had a vested interest. There is some support for the position that
payments for the release of a wife's inchoate interest in her husband's
section and [the marital property section] is to encourage the court to provide for the
financial needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the available property is insufficient for the purpose . . . may an
award of maintenance be ordered." Despite this clear indication of a preference for
property awards over maintenance, the law does not explicitly prohibit a settlement
awarding maintenance while leaving the husband with most of the marital property.
Such a settlement could hardly be held to be "unconscionable" merely because the parties do not share the Uniform Commissioners' preference for property settlements.
There may even be cases in which the apparent policy objectives underlying the Uniform Act's preference for property divisions may be better served by an award of maintenance than by a division of marital property. Suppose, for example, that the bulk
of the marital property consists of stock in a closely held corporation in which the husband, but not the wife, plays an active role. An award of some of this stock to the
wife would set the stage for many years of business disputes between the divorced
spouses, and would probably be less satisfactory, as a matter of avoiding future strife
between the spouses, than an award of maintenance.
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c)(4) (1957); see Grant R. Bishop, 55 T.C. 720 (1971),
acquiesced in, 1971-2 Cum. BuLL. I; cf. Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 10.
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property are not alimony. In Bernatschke v. United States113 the
Court of Claims held that annuity payments received by a wife were
not alimony because the payments were intended by the parties to be
compensation for the extinguishment of the wife's "dower ' 114 rights
in her husband's income-producing property. Apparently, neither of
the parties in Bernatschke argued that payments for the release
of dower or similar rights could be alimony; instead, the parties seem
to have focused solely on the factual question of whether the payments
were for the release of dower rights. If Bernatschke is correct, payments for the wife's release of her right to Missouri marital property
may well not be alimony, even if the wife's interest in marital property
is "inchoate." 115
Although Bernatschke is the only case actually to hold that payments for the release of inchoate marital property rights were not alimony, several cases have described the payments that do not qualify
for alimony treatment in terms broad enough to include payments like
those in Bernatschke. For example, in Ernest H. Mills"' the Tax
Court stated the rule denying alimony treatment to property settlement
payments as follows:
It is well settled that where, upon divorce or separation, there is a division of property or where a husband makes payments in satisfaction
of the property rights of the wife, the amounts received by his wife are
capital in nature and neither includable in her gross income under section 71 nor deductible by the husband under section 215.117
This formulation of the distinction between alimony and property settlement payments does not seem to require the wife's rights to be
vested for payments for -the release of those rights to be something
other than alimony. The Mills court did go on to describe the wife's
interest in the property (under Oklahoma law) as "vested," but noth113. 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. C1. 1966).
114. Although the Bernatschke court referred to the rights in question as "dower,"
they actually consisted of the wife's right to one-third of the husband's estate upon his
death. Id. at 406 n.6.
115. It is arguable that, even if payments for an inchoate interest in property can
sometimes be a property settlement rather than alimony, payments for future inchoate
interests such as the "dower" rights in Bernatschke should not be treated as a property settlement because of the difficulty of valuing the interests. See Marion R. Hesse,
60 T.C. 685 (1973) ($500,000 settlement held to be for support because any future
rights wife had in husband's property "were speculative and of no significant value").
116. 54 T.C. 608 (1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Lewis
B. Jackson, Jr., 54 T.C. 125 (1971).
117. 54 T.C. at 615.
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ing in the opinion suggests that the court would have allowed alimony
treatment if it had viewed those rights as inchoate.

The Tax Court's

failure to cite the alimony cases when it dealt with the Davis issue
in Wiles may suggest that it does not view the alimony cases as turning

upon whether the wife's rights were vested. However, the Tax Court
held in Irving J. Hayutin," s a memorandum decision, that periodic
payments were partially alimony because the wife's rights under Colo-

rado law were no more extensive than the rights of the taxpayer's wife
in Davis. The Hayutin opinion does not explain why payments relat-

ing to inchoate property rights are any less "property settlement" payments than payments for vested rights. The court simply said, after
concluding that the wife's interest did not amount to "co-ownership,"
that the payments in question were "obviously" not payments for property, "since her interests did not rise to the level of property rights." '

Both Bernatschke and Hayutin treated the question of the alimony
status of payments for a wife's inchoate rights in her husband's property on an "all or nothing" basis; thus, Bernatschke held that payments
for the release of inchoate property rights were necessarily "property
settlement" payments, while Hayutin held that such payments were
necessarily not "property settlement" payments.120 But the ultimate
118. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1972). Another case involving a property settlement under Colorado law is Elbert G. Sharp, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1971). In
Sharp the court held the payments in question to be a property settlement without
analysis of the nature of the Colorado wife's interest in her husband's property. The
court noted that "the relevant Colorado law only serves to further enforce our view
that none of these payments must per se be considered support payments." Id. at 798.
119. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 568. See also William C. Wright, 62 T.C.
(1974), in which the Tax Court rejected a wife's argument that payments for her inchoate interest in her husband's property under WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.26 (1967) were a
property settlement rather than alimony. The court, citing Davis for the proposition
that the wife's rights were inchoate, said that the wife "did not ... give up anything
that is recognized as supporting a division of property." This language seems to suggest that payments in exchange for "inchoate" property rights can never be a "property
settlement," but the court went on to "distinguish" Bernatschke on the ground that the
parties in Bernatschke considered the wife's inchoate rights in'determining a settlement,
while the parties in Wright considered the wife's need for support and spoke of the payments as "in lieu of alimony."
120. The Hayutin court held that the payments in question were not alimony to the
extent they were for the wife's "actual ownership rights" in property received by the
husband. Allocation of the payments between alimony and property settlement was accomplished by holding that $500 per month (the amount of temporary alimony paid
before execution of the settlement agreement) was alimony, and that the remainder
was for property. Such interim payments have often been used as evidence of the
wife's needs in cases where a dual-purpose payment must be treated as alimony in part.
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issue in the alimony cases is whether the payments in question are
"for support" of the wife, and it is questionable whether -a rule that
payments for the release of inchoate marital property rights are in all
cases either for support or not for support is sound. In Missouri the
economic position of the wife is one of several factors to be used in
determining the portion of the marital property to which she is entitled. If, in a particular case, a Missouri wife would be entitled to
a substantial award of marital property primarily because of her need
for support, it should follow that periodic payments in lieu of such
an award of marital property should also be regarded as for the wife's
support, and thus as alimony. If, on the other hand, a particular Missouri wife would be entitled to a large share of the marital property
because most of that property was purchased with her money, periodic
payments in lieu of an award of that property should be treated as
the purchase price of the property, not as support. If this analysis
is correct, the question whether periodic payments in lieu of an award
of marital property are alimony should be approached on a case-bycase basis, and a finding that periodic payments were a substitute
for an award of marital property should not settle the alimony question
one way or the other. Indeed, 'the marital property provisions may
be regarded as completely irrelevant in the context of classifying periodic payments as alimony. Since a showing that a particular wife
has a claim to a share of marital property should not resolve the alimony question, the courts may well ignore the marital property rights
altogether and resolve alimony cases by the usual method of determining whether the terms of -the agreement or decree, the circumstances
of the parties, and the history of settlement negotiations show that all
or part of the periodic payments were made to support the wife."' 1
Careful planning of settlement agreements can probably assure
either alimony or non-alimony treatment of payments to the wife, even
though the tax treatment of payments for the wife's interest in marital
property is uncertain. If it is desired that payments not be taxed as
E.g., Grant R. Bishop, 55 T.C. 720, 728 (1971), acquiesced in, 1971-2 CuM. BULL.
1; Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361, 367 (1949), acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. XX.
121. The approach suggested here will lead to different results from the approach
of the court in Hayutin only in cases in which the wife is entitled to some of the marital property in her husband's name for reasons other than her need for support. In
Ilayutin only payments for property in the wife's name were treated as property settlement payments; the court would apparently have treated all of the periodic payments
as alimony if no transfer of property from the wife to the husband had occurred.
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alimony, they can simply be made non-periodic. If alimony treatment
is desired, an agreement loaded with the kinds of provisions the courts
have used to support holdings that payments were not for property
may suffice. Because of the danger that payments for marital property may not qualify as alimony, the agreement should be drafted to
support an argument that the payments involved are not for marital
property. Although it is sometimes said that classification of payments
as "alimony" or "for property" depends upon the "substance' of the
transaction, 1 22 most of the factors used by the courts -to classify payments are within the control of the parties, and many of them are
purely formal. 1 23 If the parties refrain from making calculations based
upon the amount of marital property available for distribution,'124 if
the agreement provides for payments that are clearly "maintenance"
under Missouri law, 2 5 if property settlement payments are provided
for separately,126 if payments are to cease upon the death of either
spouse or the wife's remarriage, 2 7 and if -provision is made for increasing the payments if the wife's needs increase, 28 alimony treatment will
probably follow, even though the husband retains most of the marital
property.
The cases suggest several possible answers to the argumentl that
payments received by a wife must be for her share of property if she
122. E.g., Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
123. For discussions of these factors, see J. TAGGART, SOME TAx AsPECTs OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 37-54 (1973); Harris, supra note 105.
124. E.g., Lambros v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972); McCombs v.
Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968).
125. It is frequently said that characterization of payments in the decree or settlement agreement is not controlling. E.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1964); Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); Lewis B. Jackson,
Jr., 54 T.C. 125 (1970); Blanche Curtis Newbury, 46 T.C. 690 (1966), acquiesced in,
1970-2 CuM. BULL. xx; Ann Hairston Ryker, 33 T.C. 924 (1960). Nevertheless, the
use of such terms as "alimony," "support," or "property settlement" in decrees or agreements has been used as evidence of the intent of the parties. E.g., Lambros v. Commissioner, 459 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972); Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.
1955); Helen L. Hilgemeier, 42 T.C. 496 (1964); Corinne Pope Thompson, 22 T.C.
275 (1954), acquiesced in, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 6.

126. E.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964); Robert I. Martin, 31
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1219 (1972); Joseph S. Freeland, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1460
(1960); Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953); cf. Jerome A. Blate, 34 T.C. 121 (1960),
acquiesced in, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
127. E.g., Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. 349 (1969), acquiesced in, 1970-2 Cum.
BULL. xxi; Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968); Ernest L. Veverka, 29 CCH Tax
CL Mem. 1496 (1970); Corinne Pope Thompson, 22 T.C. 275 (1954), acquiesced in,
1954-2 CuM. BuuL. 6.
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gave up that share. It is sometimes said, for example, that a wife
may waive her claim to property and receive alimony instead.12 Thus,
although payments "for" the wife's property are not alimony, payments
"in lieu of" her claiming her property can be alimony. This is an
extremely fine distinction, upon which not too much reliance should
be placed; most of the cases in which the "waiver" -theory is found
are cases in which the wife was held not to have waived her claim
ito property. Many cases have said that alimony treatment depends
upon the intent of the parties, with intent being determined not only
from the language of the agreement but also from the testimony of
the parties'30 and their ,lawyers.' 3 1 The emphasis on intent may mean
that a showing that the parties' primary concern in negotiating a settlement was the wife's financial situation will lead to -a finding that
payments are alimony.132 Some courts have even considered the intended t consequences of an agreement as evidence of the payments' being alimony.133 Although an agreement that payments are
to be taxed a certain way will not necessarily achieve the desired result, it may at least tend to restrain -the parties from treating payments
inconsistently on their returns, a practice that is undoubtedly a major
cause of the extraordinary volume of litigation on the alimony issue. 13 4
If some good non-tax reasons for awarding the husband the bulk of
the marital property can be found, those reasons should be set forth
in the decree. The wife's only right in marital property is to receive
a "just" share, and a showing that the wife has received all the marital
property to which she was entitled should aeave no room for an argument that she sold part of her interest to the husband in exchange
for purported alimony payments.'" 5 Unfortunately, the best way to es128. E.g., Jerome A. Blate, 34 T.C. 121 (1960), acquiesced in, 1961-2 CuM. BULL.

4.
129. E.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); West v.
United States, 332 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Grant R. Bishop, 55 T.C. 720
(1971), acquiescedin, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 1.
130. E.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963); Floyd H.
Brown, 16 T.C. 623 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 CuM. BULL. 2.
131. E.g., Elbert G. Sharp, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1972); Thomas E. Hogg,
13 T.C. 361 (1949), acquiesced in, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. xx.
132. Thus, in Bernatschke the court noted that the amount of the payments was determined without consideration of the wife's income, and that the payments were not
sufficient to maintain her standard of living at the pre-divorce level. 364 F.2d at 408.
133. E.g., Ann Hairston Ryker, 33 T.C. 924 (1960). But see Ben C. Land, 61 T.C.
675 (1974).
134. See cases cited note 125 supra.

135. In Grant R. Bishop, 55 T.C. 720, 727 (1971), acquiesced in, 1971-2 CuM.
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tablish that the wife is not entitled to a large share of the marital property is to establish that her needs are small, a showing that also tends
to undermine a claim that periodic payments are intended as support.
IHL.

CONCLUSION

The client seeking advice concerning the tax consequences of a
property settlement or alimony payment is likely ,to feel, with some
justification, that he has asked a "simple question." It is outrageous
that there will often be no "simple answer." In both the appreciated
property cases and the alimony cases the issue is usually whether the
tax will be paid by the husband or by the wife,""8 with the Government
being in the position of a stakeholder, whose interest is primarily to
avoid being whipsawed. Since this is so, and since the tax burdens
of payments related to divorce will often be -the subject of negotiation
between the parties, it is more important that the tax rules be clearly
understood and that the tax consequences of proposed transfers be
consistently predictable than that any particular rule be followed. But
as long as the tax consequences of divorce-related payments are tied
as closely to local law as is the case today, uncertainty is unavoidable,
and innovations in local law, such as Missouri's, will necessarily have
unpredictable tax consequences. For these reasons, proposals for legislative reform deserve serious consideration.
The American Bar Association's proposal to change the rule of the
Davis case by statute 1 7 is commendable. It is safe to say that income
from Davis-type transfers is very often unreported. Most laymen, and
a good many lawyers, would never suspect that the transfer of property
from a husband to his wife could subject the husband to taxation. The
tax treatment of transactions engaged in by millions should, to the
greatest extent possible, correspond to the parties' expectations. Furthermore, the ABA proposal would eliminate an unjustifiable differBuLL 1, the husband made this argument but lost because he failed to convince the
court that his wife was not entitled to a substantial share of the community property.
136. If the wife does not sell the property she receives, or if gain on the sale is
not taxed (under § 1034, for example), gain may go untaxed forever because of the
stepped-up-basis-at-death provisions. Professor Schwartz suggests that this may be the
stumbling block to the enactment of the ABA proposal. Schwartz, supra note 23, at
199.
137. Report of the Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems, 19 BuLL. op
ABA SE CION OF TAXATION 62, 63 (1966).
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ence between -the tax treatment of residents of common law states and
that of residents of community property states.
The ABA would also change the definition of alimony, although
only in the case of payments that are periodic under the ten-year rule
of section 71(c)(2). 138 Such payments would be treated as "for support" (and therefore as alimony) unless the parties expressly provide
in the decree of agreement that the payments are "for the purchase
of property rights." In the case of payments that are periodic only under section 71(c)(2), this proposal should eliminate some of the uncertainty caused by the "support" requirement, although it would be
unduly optimistic to expect that litigation would be much reduced. 3
The American Law Institute140 would go even further than the ABA,

eliminating the support requirement entirely. The ALI proposal
would resolve the question whether payments for "marital property"
under statutes like Missouri's can qualify as alimony, for the ALI proposal would tax as alimony all periodic payments except those -that are
"independent of the marriage."' 14 While payments for property actually owned by the wife would seem not to be alimony even under
the ALMs definition, payments for property in which
the wife's only
42
interest arises from her marital status should qualify.1
138. ABA Report, supra note 137, at 62.
139. For one thing, the proposal would not affect periodic payments not described
in § 71(c)(2). Furthermore, the proposal is similar to § 71(b), which provides that
payments which the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement "fix" as child support payments are not alimony. Despite the apparent simplicity of § 71(b), and despite the literalness with which that section was construed in Commissioner v. Lester,
366 U.S. 299 (1961), there is an enormous amount of litigation over whether payments
are child support. The continuing flood of litigation on the child support issue is probably a symptom of the hostility sometimes found between ex-spouses rather than of any
uncertainty as to what the law is. But if litigation cannot be eliminated by legislative
reform, such reform may at least make the courts' task easier.
140. ALI FED. INcomE TAX STAT. § X127 (Feb. 1954 Draft).
141. Id. § X127, Comment.
142. These proposals are somewhat similar to § 2516, which, in the case of the gift
tax, substitutes a simple, arbitrary rule for the case law complexities created by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). '
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